CEO compensation and bank efficiency: an application of conditional nonparametric frontiers by Matousek, Roman & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G.
Matousek, Roman and Tzeremes, Nickolaos G. (2016) 
CEO compensation and bank efficiency: an application 
of conditional nonparametric frontiers. European Journal 
of Operational Research, 251 (1). pp. 264-273. ISSN 
0377-2217 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51645/1/Matousek_Tzeremes_EJOR.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No 
Derivatives licence and may be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more 
details see: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
 1 
 
CEO compensation and bank efficiency: An application of 
conditional nonparametric frontiers 
 
By 
Roman Matousek1, Nickolaos G. Tzeremes2 
1Kent Business School, The University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7PE, UK. 
Corresponding author’s e-mail address: R.Matousek@kent.ac.uk  
2Laboratory of Operations Research, Department of Economics, University of 
Thessaly, Korai 43, 38333, Volos, Greece. 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper, by incorporating the latest developments on the probabilistic approach of 
efficiency measurement, (Bădin et al., 2012) investigates in a dynamic context the 
effect of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) bonus and salary payments on banks’ technical 
efficiency levels. We apply time-dependent conditional efficiency estimates to analyze 
a sample of 37 US banks for the period from 2003  to 2012. The empirical evidence 
reveals a non-linear relationship between CEO bonus and salary payments and banks’ 
efficiency levels. More specifically it is reported that salary and bonus payments affect 
differently banks’ technological change and technological catch-up levels. Finally, the 
empirical evidence suggests that higher salary and bonus payments are not always 
aligned with higher technical efficiency levels. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decades several influential papers1 have explored empirically the link 
between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation levels and firms’ performance 
(known as pay-for-performance relationship). These studies examine the pay-for-
performance relationship mainly for industrial US firms. They explored how firms’ 
performance2 determines CEO compensation levels. The majority of the empirical 
evidence suggest that the relationship is positive,3 however, there are also a few studies 
providing evidence of a weak relationship (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Zhou, 2000; 
Buck et al., 2003). On the other hand, some other studies report that there is even a 
negative relationship between excess CEO compensation and firms’ performance (Core 
et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006). Arguments in the literature (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; 
Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Hambrick and 
Quigley, 2014) suggest that when managerial discretion4 and CEO compensation are 
aligned then firm performance should be higher. Furthermore, earlier studies suggest 
that cash compensation should be structured in such a way that will enable high rewards 
to be associated with high performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, 1990b; Mehran, 
1995; Hall and Leibman, 1997).  
Despite the importance of such a relationship in the banking industry, 
surprisingly a few empirical studies have been exploring the link between CEO 
compensation and bank performance. This study contributes to current empirical 
                                                 
1See, for example, Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Murphy (1985), Jensen and 
Murphy (1990a,b),  Kaplan (1994), Mehran (1995), Hall and Leibman (1997), Finkelstein and Boynd 
(1998) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a,b).  
2The extant research uses stock prices and financial and accounting based ratios as a measure of firms’ 
performance. 
3For an extensive literature review see Murphy (1999) and Core et al. (2003). 
4Managerial discretion is the ability of a CEO (or a top manager) to make strategic decisions that have 
both direct and indirect impact on firms’ performance (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003) 
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research on CEO compensation in general and banking in particular. The paper differs 
from other recent studies in several ways.  
Firstly, we explore for the first time the effect of CEO bonus and salary 
payments on banks’ efficiency levels. We use a sample of 37 US bank holding 
companies over the period from 2003 to 2012. We examine in a nonparametric context 
the CEO payment-bank performance relationship. Secondly, we apply the latest 
developments of data envelopment analysis (DEA),5 as have been introduced by Bădin 
et al. (2012) and Mastromarco and Simar (2014). Specifically, we model bank technical 
efficiency by taking into consideration time effects and the effects imposed by CEO 
compensation levels without imposing the restrictive separability assumption.6 This is 
done by treating time and CEO compensation levels as external/environmental factors 
which in turn influence banks' production process. A number of recent studies, e.g. 
Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen, 2008; Hayes and Shaefer, 
2009; Bizjak, Lemmon and Nguyen, 2011; among others, provide empirical support for 
the view that there is a common practice of competitive benchmarking to determine 
CEO compensation. Bizjak et al. (2008) point out that the practice is questionable since 
it can increase executive pay without taking into account a firm’s performance. On the 
other hand, competitive benchmarking can be used as an efficient tool to retain valuable 
CEOs. In other words, CEO compensation is not necessarily determined by the firm 
itself but reflects compensation packages across the sector7.    
Moreover, we apply full and partial time-dependent conditional efficiency 
measures that enable us to explore separately the effect of time and CEO bonus and 
                                                 
5Recently Chen et al. (2013) have illustrated the usefulness of DEA methodology for the top management 
level due its ability to measure firms’ performance by identifying the firms’ imposing competitive 
advantage. 
6For details see the studies by Simar and Wilson (2007, 2011). 
7 In a competitive environment, there is a high degree of discretion of how CEOs are compensated, see, 
for example, Finkelstein and  Boynd (1998) for a further discussion. 
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salary payments on banks’ technological change (shifting of the frontier) and 
technological catch-up (distribution of efficiency).8 Thirdly, we deploy banks’ 
technical efficiency estimates instead of financial and accounting based ratios that are 
commonly used. Such an approach circumvents all the disadvantages related to those 
performance measures. The advantages of using relative rather than absolute measures 
for the analysis of the pay-for-performance relationship are discussed in detail by Antle 
and Smith (1986) and Gibbons and Murphy (1990). Steigenberger (2014) then 
discusses the limitation of financial and accounting ratios as a measure of firms’ 
performance. Fourthly, our model does not impose any assumptions related to the 
functional form of the examined relationship that allows us to reveal any nonlinearities. 
This is an important contribution to current research in the banking industry. The 
previous studies have assumed a linear relationship between CEO remuneration and 
bank performance. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature 
of the pay-for-performance relationship with a particular emphasis on the banking 
sector.  Section 3 provides a description of the variables used and presents the proposed 
methodological framework. Finally,  Section 4 discusses the empirical findings. Section 
5 provides a summary of our findings.   
 
2. Review of the literature 
The prevailing empirical research on the CEO compensation-firm performance 
relationship has mostly been conducted for industrial firms.9 Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985), for example, examine how the changes in compensation affect stock price 
                                                 
8See, for example, Kumar and Russell (2002) and Henderson and Russell (2005). 
9 This was mainly related to data availability issues. 
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performance. They provide supporting evidence that compensation affects both firms’ 
stock price and sales growth levels. Murphy (1985) analyzes the same relationship by 
adopting, as a dependent variable, the compensation level and as an independent 
variable, shareholder returns (rather than accounting profits) and growth of firms sales  
on the sample of 500 executives from the 73 largest manufacturing companies over the 
period from 1964 to 1981. The study shows that the performance measures that were 
adopted are strongly related to CEO compensation. Jensen and Murphy (1990a) also 
argue that CEOs’ financial rewards affect directly firms’ performance levels. They 
conclude that CEOs’ remuneration incentives are very important determinants of firms’ 
performance levels. In addition, they provide evidence that CEOs’ performance 
incentives come from stock ownership. Jensen and Murphy (1990b) then emphasise 
that cash compensation should be structured in such a way that enables high rewards to 
be associated with high performance. There is, however, evidence that cash 
compensation and corporate performance are weakly interrelated. Thus, it means that 
the ‘efficient’ structure of cash compensation should reflect upon firms’ performance 
levels. In the same spirit, Kaplan (1994) regresses the annual compensation changes on 
several accounting and share price performance metrics for 119 Japanese companies 
over the period from 1982 to 1984. He provides evidence of a positive relationship 
between compensation and firm performance. Mehran (1995) further examines CEO 
compensation and firm performance. The model uses as dependent variables two 
performance measures: Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. The tested sample 
includes 153 manufacturing firms during the period from 1979 to 1980. The findings 
of this study shows that CEO compensation explains significantly firms’ performance 
variations. In other words, the structure of compensation is a crucial determinant for 
firm performance. Hall and Leibman (1997) provide empirical evidence of a positive 
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relationship between CEO compensation and firms’ financial performance. Finkelstein 
and Boynd (1998) use as a measure of performance Return on Equity (ROE)and ROA. 
They find that prior firm performance is not linked to CEO compensation but firm size 
is a key determinant. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) show that relative performance 
evaluations are not linked with CEOs compensation contracts. Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999b) provide convincing evidence that there is a link between sensitivity of 
compensation with the performance of rival firms. They also suggest that relative 
performance evaluation is very important for our understanding of executive 
compensation. 
On the other hand, there are a number of studies that confirm the relationship 
between CEO rewards and firms’ performance. Brunello et al. (2001), who use a sample 
of 107 Italian firms, point out the positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
firms’ profit levels. Mitsudome et al. (2008) compare Japanese and US companies and 
their results indicate that there is a significantly positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and short-term performance. However, they could not confirm such a 
relationship for the Japanese firms when they use sales growth levels as a proxy for 
firm performance.  
Barro and Barro’s (1990) study was among the first studies to investigate pay-
for-performance contracts in the banking industry. They explore the relationship using 
a sample that includes US commercial banks during the period from 1982 to 1987. They 
find that the growth of compensation is positively related to accounting earnings and 
stock returns. That means the compensation growth depends on relative and aggregate 
performance. Later Hubbard and Palia (1995) provide evidence of a stronger 
relationship of compensation–performance during the 1980s, i.e., the period of 
interstate banking permission. They show that bank size also determines the level of 
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compensation. Crawford et al. (1995) examined the sensitivity of CEO performance 
after the deregulation period for a sample of 37 commercial banks over the period from 
1976 to 1982.  They provide evidence that during the deregulation period there was an 
increase in pay-performance sensitivities.  Houston and James (1995) analyze a sample 
of 134 banks over the period from 1980 to 1990 and examine the determinants of CEO 
cash compensation (salary plus bonus) and CEO stock and option holdings. They find 
that there is a positive relationship between stockholder wealth with both types of 
compensation. They also provide evidence that bank CEOs’ cash compensation is 
sensitive to stock market performance. Furthermore, their findings suggest that for 
larger banks the pay for performance relationship is relatively weak. In contrast, Bliss 
and Rosen (2001) provide evidence that bank mergers and acquisitions contributed to 
a significant increase in CEO compensation, despite the fact that shareholder values 
declined through the lower value of bank shares. Their findings support several other 
studies suggesting that the size has a positive influence on CEO compensation. Ang et 
al. (2002), by using a sample of 166 US banks, provide evidence that the compensation 
of top bank executives is determined by bank performance and the size of the bank. 
They also show that the payment is higher when it is linked to long-term performance 
achievements. John and Qian (2003) examine the pay for performance sensitivity for a 
sample of 120 commercial banks and a sample of 997 manufacturing firms over the 
period from 1992 to 2000. Their results suggest that pay for performance sensitivity is 
lower for regulated firms and decreases with firm size and their debt ratio. In addition, 
they show that banks have lower pay for performance sensitivity than manufacturing 
firms. Anderson et al. (2004) show on the sample of 97 US bank mergers over the 
period from 1990 to 1997, that CEO compensation is related to the potential gains 
obtained from the bank merger.   
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A recent study by Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009), who analyze the sample of 
commercial banks and financial services firms from Standard and Poor’s 1500 index, 
show that total shareholder values that are used as a proxy for performance is positively 
linked with CEO compensation levels. John et al. (2010) examine a sample of bank 
holding companies during the period from 1993 to 2007. They find that the pay for 
performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation decreases with the leverage ratio 
(defined as one minus the ratio of equity over assets) and it is positively related to the 
monitoring intensity (measured by subordinated debt rating, non-performing loan ratio 
and BOPEC rating). Livne et al. (2011) find a positive link between banks’ CEO pay 
and fair value valuation of available for sales assets. Finally, Livne et al. (2013) provide 
evidence that executive cash bonuses are linked with a simultaneously CEO risk-taking 
incentives, and a decrease of banks’ accounting performance. 
The above brief review of the literature indicates that there are some pay-for-
performance studies that explore how banks’ performance determines CEO 
compensation levels. However, we find a gap in current research that analyses how 
CEO compensation affects bank performance. Furthermore, it is also evident that the 
relative literature applies mostly the parametric approaches to investigate the pay-for-
performance relationship. In other words, the model assumes a linear relationship 
between bank performance and CEO compensation. To this end our paper contributes 
to the literature by incorporating into our analysis a fully non-parametric framework 
enabling us to reveal any non-linear links. This can be accomplished by applying the 
latest developments of the probabilistic approach of efficiency measurement which are 
presented in the next section.   
 
3. Data and methodology  
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3.1 Description of variables 
We collect data for CEO compensation from Compustat Execucomp Database during 
the period from 2003 to 2012. The excessive compensation rewards of CEOs in the 
USA were criticised for a long time. In July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act was introduced as a reaction to the Global Financial 
Crisis, when a large number of financial institutions collapsed. The Dodd-Frank Act is 
a complex Act dealing with different aspects of financial regulation that should prevent 
the repetition of the financial crisis in 2008. It embeds, among other regulatory changes, 
a systemic change of CEO compensation.  In particular, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act proposes provisions that affect executive 
compensation (Cotter et al (2013) and Kaplan (2012)). These provisions include: i) 
Advisory votes of shareholders about executive compensation and golden parachutes, 
including specific disclosure of golden parachutes in merger proxies; ii) disclosure 
about the role of, and potential conflicts involving, compensation consultants; iii) 
additional disclosure about certain compensation matters, including pay-for-
performance and the ratio between the CEO’s total compensation and the median total 
compensation for all other company employees; iv) the Commission to direct the 
exchanges to prohibit the listing of securities of issuers that have not developed and 
implemented compensation claw-back policies; and v) a disclosure about whether 
directors and employees are permitted to hedge any decrease in market value of the 
company’s stock. 
All those changes have been gradually implemented by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). In the period from 2010–2012, the SEC implemented 
the rules that require institutional investment managers to report their votes on 
executive compensation and "golden parachute" arrangements. The SEC also adopted 
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rules concerning shareholder approval of executive compensation and "golden 
parachute" compensation arrangements. Finally in July 2012, the SEC adopted rules 
regarding the disclosure about the role of, and potential conflicts involving, 
compensation consultants. In 2013, the SEC then adopted rules regarding pay ratios. In 
2015, the Commission proposed rules regarding disclosure about whether directors and 
employees are permitted to hedge any decrease in market value of the company’s stock 
and finally the Commission proposed rules regarding pay for performance disclosure.   
It is evident that these rules do not impose any significant restrictions on CEO 
compensation but require disclosure of information about CEO compenstation. In other 
words, our sample that covers the period from 2003–2012 is not biased due to the 
systematic changes in CEO remuneration. The main changes were introduced after 
2012 that includes also pay performance related compensation disclosure. 
 We select financial institutions with Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 
codes between 6000 and 6300. We then exclude manually financial institutions with 
SIC code 6282 (Investment Advice); SIC codes 6111 (federal credit agency); SIC code 
6199 (Finance Services); and SIC code 6211 (Security Brokers and Dealers). The final 
sample includes 37 US bank holding companies that were active during the period from 
2003 to 2012. The Compustat Execucomp Database allows us to extract and divide 
CEO compensation into several categories. In our analysis, we use for CEO payment 
the total current compensation values that are directly extracted from the database and 
include salary and bonuses. As for financial statement data, these data are obtained from 
Bankscope, which is the most widely used database for financial institutions. We 
collected defined variables from consolidated financial statements for bank holding 
companies. 
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Furthermore, for our DEA context we need to specify banks’ production 
function. Hugh and Mester (2008) argue that bank production is unique to the 
production of other types of lenders. They show that banks have a special capital 
structure, i.e. the bank production process is based on the intermediation of deposits 
into informationally opaque assets. This argument is further supported by Berlin and 
Mester (2000), who provide empirical evidence of an explicit link between banks’ 
liability structure and banks’ lending behaviour. Such findings correspond with the role 
of banks in the economic system. Banks can reduce the problem of asymmetric 
information that is reflected consequently by reducing bank risk during its production 
process. Hugh and Mester (2008) further argue that this leads to efficient and prudent 
production of financial services.  
 
Thus we apply the intermediation approach as proposed by Sealey and Lindley 
(1977) and has been followed by empirical research on bank efficiency, (eg. Curi, 
Lozano-Vivas, Zelenyuk, 2015; Fujii et al., 2014; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010; Hugh and 
Mester , 1998) 
Under the intermediation approach the inputs used are property, plant and 
equipment (a proxy for bank capital), deposits and number of employees. Bank outputs 
are defined as securities and loans. Furthermore, we use CEO salary and bonus 
payments in our model. Tables 1 & 2 present analytically (per year and per bank) the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. 
[Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2 Time-dependent conditional efficiency measures 
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Following Koopmans (1951) and Debreu (1951) the production technology is 
characterized by a set of inputs px  that can produce a set of outputs
qy  . Then 
the technically feasible combinations of  ,x y can characterize the production set as: 
  ,  can produce .p qx y x y         (1) 
Then the Farrell (1957) measure of input oriented efficiency score for a unit 
operating at the level  ,x y  can be defined as: 
    , inf , .x y x y            (2) 
According to Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007a) the production set can also be 
characterized as: 
    ,, , 0 ,X Yx y H x y                                                                     (3) where  
     
   
, , Prob Prob
                
X Y
YX Y
H x y X x Y y Y y
F x y S y
   

.      (4) 
Therefore, the production process can be described by the joint probability of 
 ,X Y  on p q   . Then the Farrell-Debreu measure of input oriented efficiency can 
also be characterized as: 
       , inf 0 inf , 0 .XYX Yx y F x y H x y             (5) 
Mastromarco and Simar (2014) introduce, for the first time, the time-dependent 
conditional efficiency measures based on the probabilistic approach by Daraio and 
Simar (2005, 2007a) and the latest developments by Bădin et al. (2012). Similarly, let 
the time T be an additional conditional variable with those examined in our case (bonus 
and salary payments). Then for each time period t  the attainable set 
z p q
t R

   can be 
defined as the support of the conditional probability: 
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   
   
,
,
, Prob , ,
                   ,
t
X Y Z
t t
X Y Z Y Z
H x y z X x Y y Z z T t
F x y z S y z
    

 ,    (6) 
where    , , Prob , ,
t
X Y Z
F x y z X x Y y Z z T t      ,    (7) 
and    Prob ,tY ZS y z Y y Z z T t    .      (8) 
Then the full frontier case input oriented technical efficiency of a bank 
 , ztx y  , at time t  facing the conditions z  can be defined as: 
    ,, inf , 0 .tt X Y Zx y z F x y z          (9) 
For the full frontier estimation we have used the assumption of variable returns 
to scale (VRS). This assumption is commonly used in banking efficiency literature by 
incorporating directly banks' scale effects. However, it must be noted that there is also 
support from several authors for the constant returns to scale (CRS) assumption (Kumar 
and Russell, 2002; Henderson and Russell, 2005; Henderson and Zelenyuk, 2007; 
Mastromarco and Simar, 2014) since it can provide us with a greater discriminative 
power compared to the VRS assumption (Zelenyuk and Zheka, 2006). 
Furthermore, the order-α quantile efficiency measure (also called robust or 
partial frontiers) for the input oriented case as introduced by Daouia and Simar (2007) 
can be defined for 
 0,1
 as: 
            
    , inf 1X Yx y F x y     
.              (10) 
Therefore, the order-α quantile efficiency measure of a bank  , ztx y  , at 
time t  facing the conditions z  can be defined as:10 
    , ,, inf , 1 .tt X Y Zx y z F x y z                    (11) 
                                                 
10For the asymptotic properties of conditional measures see Jeong et al. (2010). 
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For the partial frontiers (conditional and unconditional) we have used 0.5 
which according to Bădin et al. (2012) correspond to the median frontiers and thus 
enable us to explore the potential shift of the distribution of the efficiencies as a function 
of time, bonus and salary payments. However, as suggested also by Bădin et al. (2014) 
we need to apply also  values close to 1 in order to check the robustness of the results 
obtained from the full frontier when interpreter the results from the full frontiers. For 
that reason also an 0.95   has been applied. 
We adopt smoothing techniques in order to condition the external variables and 
compute the conditional efficiency estimators. Therefore, we apply the approach 
proposed by Bădin et al. (2010) for bandwidth selection  h .11 Furthermore, our model 
requires to calculate a nonparametric estimator  , ,
t
X Y Z
F x y z , where we condition on 
Y y , time T t  and a particular value of Z z . This can be estimated as: 
 
      
      
,
,
,
,
ˆ ,
z t
z t
j j h j hj it
X Y Z
j h j hj i
x x y y K z z K t
F x y z
y y K z z K t






    

   


.             (12) 
We also have to note that zh  and th are the bandwidths of optimal size. Whereas  .K
is the kernel function with compact support. However, since we examine two 
exogenous factors (bonus and salary payments), we use a product kernel with a vector 
of bandwidths.12  
Finally, in order to examine the effect of time and CEO salary and bonus 
payments on banks’ performance levels, we adopt the approach introduced by Bădin et 
                                                 
11Bădin et al. (2010) describe in detail the procedure and provide the Matlab codes for the calculation of 
optimal bandwidth h (also called smoothing parameter).  
12For more details regarding computational issues of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) estimators 
and bandwidth selection see the studies by Bădin et al. (2010, 2012) and Mastromarco and Simar, (2014). 
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al. (2012) by creating the ratios of conditional to unconditional efficiency estimates 
from the full and partial frontier measures:13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
,
,
, ,
, , ,       , , .
, ,
t t
I I
x y z x y z
R x y z t R x y z t
x y x y



 
 
                 (13)  
Next, we apply nonparametric regressions and we explore the effect of T and 
Z  by examining the behaviour of  ˆ , ,IR x y z t and  ,ˆ , ,IR x y z t as a function of T and 
Z . Thus, we are able to investigate the dynamic effects of CEO bonus and salary 
payments on banks’ technological change (shift of the frontier) and technological catch-
up (distribution of efficiency). Based on Kumar and Russell (2002) and Henderson and 
Russell (2005), banks’ technological changes is represented by the ‘shifts in banks’ 
production frontier’ whereas banks’ technological catch-up are represented by the 
‘movements toward or away from their production frontier’.  
 We apply a local linear estimator and optimal bandwidths using the least 
squares cross-validation (LSCV) criterion in the same way as presented by Hall et al., 
2004; Li and Racine, 2004, 2007; Hayfield and Racine, 2008 among others.. Since we 
are using input oriented measures, Bădin et al. (2012) suggest that a tendency of the 
ratio  ˆ , ,IR x y z t  to increase alongside the conditioning variables indicates an 
unfavorable effect on banks’ technological change (shift of the frontier). In contrast a 
tendency of the ratio  ˆ , ,IR x y z t  to decrease alongside with the conditioning variables 
indicates a favorable effect. Similarly, a tendency of the ratio  ,ˆ , ,IR x y z t  to increase 
with conditioning variables indicates again an unfavorable effect on banks’ 
technological catch-up (distribution of efficiency) and unfavorable in the opposite case. 
                                                 
13For our calculation of the efficiency estimates we have used the ‘FEAR’ package which is an integrated 
program in ‘R’ language (Wilson, 2008). 
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4. Empirical findings 
Tables 1 and 2 provide a basic information about our sample. As we can see 
there are large differences within time periods which indicate the presence of potential 
outliers and dimensionality problems that can significantly distort the precision of our 
estimates. Therefore we have to reduce the dimension in the input-output space and 
thus to gain precision and reliability in our analysis. As proposed by Bădin et al. (2012) 
and Daraio et al. (2015), we apply a variable reduction procedure and we replace the 
inputs and outputs by their best (non-centered) linear combinations (see for details 
Daraio and Simar, 2007b, pp. 148–150). As a result of that, we reduce the problem of 
dimensionality without losing any information, since the resulting univariate input (IF) 
and output (OF) factors are highly correlated with the original inputs and outputs used. 
The results from the input/output reduction are: 
 
1 2 3
1 2
0.567 0.581 0.584
0.707 0.717
IF X X X
OF Y Y
  
 
 
 
Furthermore, we obtain the following correlations for inputs 
 ,ˆ 0.926,0.954,0.946kIF X   for 1,2,3k  . It means that the obtained IF explains over 
90% of total inertia of our original inputs. For the case of the outputs, we obtain 
 ,ˆ 0.949,0.925kOF Y   for  1,2k  . In other words, the obtained OF explains again 
over 90% of total inertia of our original outputs. Thus, we have one input and one output 
that minimize the problem of dimensionality.14  
                                                 
14 For a discussion on the subject matter see Dyson et al. (2001).  
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 Following the methodology described previously, Table 3 presents banks’ mean 
efficiency estimates and their standard deviation values over the period from 2003 to 
2012, both for full and robust measures.15 The results reveal that there are differences 
between the mean efficiencies values between the VRS and the Order-α estimates (with 
0.5  ). Specifically, for Hudson City Bancorp Inc, Bank of New York Mellon Corp, 
Astoria Financial Corp, New York Cmnty Bancorp Inc, Washington Federal Inc, 
Cathay General Bancorp, First Bancorp P R, Bank of Hawaii Corp, Westamerica 
Bancorporation and United Bankshares Inc/WV the results between the robust and full 
frontiers indicate high efficiency differences (on average terms). Moreover, in the case 
of full frontiers 12 banks report the standard deviation efficiency values greater than 
0.1. Similarly, when we examine the results of the robust frontiers also 12 banks report 
the standard deviation efficiency values greater than 0.1. That suggests that in both 
cases we have higher efficiency fluctuations over the examined period. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Figure 1 presents diachronically the number of banks with efficiency values 
above the sample’s mean efficiency value, both for the full and robust frontiers. As we 
observe for the case of full frontiers (solid line), the number of banks that have technical 
efficiency scores above the sample’s average value increases till 2007. This result 
changes after 2007, when the US banks were affected by the global financial crisis.  We 
can observe that the number of banks with the technical efficiency scores over the 
average value decreases. We can also see that in the case of the robust frontiers (dashed 
                                                 
15The analytical results of the estimated efficiencies both for the conditional and unconditional 
measures for the full and robust frontiers are available upon request.  
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line), this phenomenon is even more pronounced. We can further observe a decrease in 
the number of banks that have technical efficiency scores above the sample’s average 
value from 2005 and as we move towards the initiation period of the global financial 
crisis this number reduces considerably. However, after 2008 the results reveal that the 
number of banks having technical efficiency score above the sample average value 
increases but with some fluctuations (especially during the period from 2008 to 2011). 
In both cases, the results emphasize the negative effect of the global financial crisis on 
bank performance levels. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 2 then illustrates graphically the effect of CEO compensation on banks’ 
performance levels. More analytically, sub-figures 2a, 2c and 2e present the effect of 
time and CEO salaries on banks’ technological change (shift of the frontier) and 
technological catch-up (distribution of efficiencies). In addition sub-figures 2b, 2d and 
2f present the effect of time and CEO bonus payments on banks’ technological change 
and technological catch-up. As we have already explained, we use input oriented 
efficiency measures and an increasing nonparametric regression line indicates a 
negative effect of the external variables (time, salary and bonus). A decreasing line 
indicates a positive effect. When analyzing the effect of time and salary on banks’ 
technological change (sub-figure 2a), we observe that for lower CEO salary levels the 
effect is negative. On the other hand, for higher salary values, we observe that the effect 
is positive.  
If we examine the effect of CEO bonuses and time on banks’ technological 
change (sub-figure 2b), we observe a different effect. For lower bonus levels the effect 
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is positive that is represented as a decreasing nonparametric regression line, up to a 
certain bonus level. However, as we move towards the end of the period the effect from 
neutral turns to negative, which is indicated by an increasing nonparametric line.  
Furthermore, when we examine the dynamic effect of CEO salary and bonus 
levels on banks’ technological catch–up (subfigures 2c and 2d), we observe a similar 
behaviour. As we have already mentioned, we set 0.5   in order to observe the effect 
of time, bonus and salary payments on the middle of the distribution of banks' 
efficiencies. Our 3-dimensional picture reveals that for lower salary levels the effect is 
negative – an increasing nonparametric line. We observe that after a certain threshold 
salary level the effect becomes then positive, a decreasing nonparametric line. When 
we examine the behaviour of salary on banks' efficiency levels, we observe that as we 
move towards and away from the global financial crisis period, the effect described 
previously becomes more emphatic. Similarly, when we examine the effect of bonus 
on banks' distribution of efficiencies again we observe that for small levels of bonus 
payments the effect on banks' efficiency levels is positive but for higher bonuses the 
effect becomes negative. When we move towards the end of the period this effect 
becomes more pronounced.  
The 3-dimensional pictures 2e and 2f provide us with the same information of 
the effect of bonuses and payments on banks' technological change as in sub-figures 2a 
and 2b. However, as has been suggested by Bădin et al. (2012) when we apply the 
Order-α frontiers and we set  near to 1 (in our case 0.95  ), then we can have a 
robust visualization of the examined effects since in some cases some extreme data 
points can mask over some effect of bonus, salaries and time. If we compare our four 
3-dimensional pictures (i.e. 2a with 2e and 2b with 2f), we can observe differences in 
the effect on banks' technological change levels. These differences are attributed to the 
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extreme data points. Specifically, when we examine the effect of salary and time on 
banks' technological change levels (sub-figure 2e), we observe that for lower salary 
levels the effect is negative up to a certain salary level. After that level, and for the 
largest part of salary levels, the effect becomes positive. Furthermore, when we 
compare the 3-dimensional picture from the partial frontier in subfigure 2e with the one 
for the full frontier (subfigure 2a), we can conclude that the effect of salary on banks’ 
technological change is the same throughout the examined period and does not change. 
Thus it is evident that extreme data point can mask over the examined effect and 
therefore the need to apply robust frontiers with   values near to 1 proven to be 
essential for our case. In the same way subfigure 2f presents the effect of bonus payment 
and time on countries’ technological change levels using robust frontiers. In contrast to 
subfigure 2b, the 3-dimensional picture presented on subfigure 2f provides us with a 
robust view of the effect avoiding the influence of extreme data points. The results 
reveal a clear positive effect on banks’ technological change levels for lower levels of 
bonus payments, however, for larger levels of bonus payments the effect become 
negative. It is also evident that this effect is observed throughout the entire period. 
However, this was not the case when we examine the same effect under the full frontiers 
(subfigure 2b), suggesting that the extreme data points mask over the examined effect. 
The overall results suggest that higher levels of CEO salaries affect positively 
banks’ technological change and technological catch-up, whereas higher levels of CEO 
bonuses affect them negatively. According to Crawford et al. (1995) the deregulation 
of banks provides the framework for riskier investments. In our setting risk-taking 
involves the over-investment in risky loans and securities (Kupiec and O'Brien, 1997). 
As a result shareholders use performance-pay schemes to encourage risk-taking by 
CEOs. The positive correlation between CEO compensation and corporate risk is well 
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documented in the relative literature (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Gormley et al., 
2013),16 this in turn justifies our findings regarding the negative effect of higher levels 
of CEO bonus payments. Since the CEO bonus payments are associated with risk 
investments, this in turn reflects negatively on banks’ technological change and 
technological catch-up levels. On the other hand, since technological change 
investments are regarded as a source of systematic risk (Papanikolaou, 2008), the 
positive effect of higher levels of CEO salary payments on banks’ technology change 
and technological catch-up can be attributed to the positive correlation between riskier 
investments and CEO incentives.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
5. Conclusions 
In our study, we apply an innovative methodological framework to explore the 
effect of CEO salary and bonus payments on banks’ efficiency levels. We find that the 
effect of CEO cash compensation on bank performance has a nonlinear form. These 
results challenge the findings presented by studies that apply the traditional pay-for-
performance relationship investigated in a parametric setup, eg. Ang et al., 2002; John 
and Qian, 2003; Anderson et al. 2004; Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2009; among other studies 
that assume ex-ante a linear relation. We also argue that higher CEO compensation 
levels do not necessarily improve bank efficiency. Our results indicate that CEO salary 
and bonus payments affect differently bank technological change and technological 
catch-up levels. We show that lower salaries have a negative effect on bank 
technological change and technological catch-up levels. That means CEOs have to be 
                                                 
16 Additionally, Brissimis et al. (2008) suggest that capital and credit risk have a negative relationship 
on banks’ efficiency levels. 
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paid above a certain threshold level in order to affect bank performance positively. We 
also show that higher bonuses as a performance related part of the total CEO 
remuneration package do not have the expected effect on bank technological change 
and technological catch-up levels. These results correspond to previous research studies 
that explore the CEO payment incentives and risk investments, eg. Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999a; Gormley et al., 2013; among others. Riskier investments have a 
negative effect on bank efficiency levels (Brissimis et al., 2008), and therefore CEO 
payment incentives that are interrelated with such investments (loans and securities) 
also have a negative effect. This is supported by our empirical findings that indicate 
that higher levels of CEO bonus payments can lead to risk taking involving the over-
investment in risky loans and securities (Kupiec and O'Brien, 1997). This consequently 
negatively affects bank technological change and technological catch-up levels.  
A logical extension of this study might be to further explore the effect of time 
and CEO compensation on bank performance levels in other geographical locations, 
and in particular in Europe. In terms of methodological framework it would be worth  
investigating the probabilistic characterization of directional distance functions, as 
proposed by Simar and Vanhems, 2012 and the new developments involved in the 
conditional directional distances, as discussed by Daraio and Simar, 2014. However, 
the proposed research extensions are beyond the scope of our paper and are left for 
future research. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
    
Property Plant and Equipment 
USD (000’ s) 
 
Deposits 
USD (000’ s) 
Number of 
 Employees 
(000’ s) 
Securities 
USD (000’ s) 
Loans 
USD (000’ s) 
Salary 
USD (000’ s) 
Bonus 
USD (000’ s) 
2003 Mean 276.784 31926.882 12.679 9765.726 25606.215 531.370 775.988 
 Std 859.676 66985.126 27.734 18509.018 51543.541 214.180 1445.749 
 29 
 Min 2.463 869.553 0.332 382.479 703.184 129.808 0.000 
  Max 4305.000 326492.000 140.000 102078 244705 1000.000 7498.232 
2004 Mean 270.422 39185.947 14.777 10983.952 32893.404 583.401 922.024 
 Std 832.522 95081.974 35.077 24223.132 74135.695 220.248 1405.517 
 Min 1.898 1239.532 0.395 568.23 980.281 249.615 0.000 
  Max 3835.000 521456.000 160.968 141940 365051 1000.000 6500.000 
2005 Mean 306.669 43121.738 15.551 10876.794 35895.247 621.519 1072.474 
 Std 964.719 102621.554 36.836 21538.155 77810.279 215.704 1653.746 
 Min 2.334 1726.401 0.397 268.657 1340.065 259.014 0.000 
  Max 4318.000 554991.000 168.847 122204 375237 1000.000 8400.000 
2006 Mean 261.529 46310.102 15.890 11725.839 38677.679 662.560 510.022 
 Std 773.399 114149.688 37.936 28087.04 83999.715 214.137 2135.407 
 Min 1.265 1729.659 0.409 215.515 1453.185 298.438 0.000 
  Max 3577.000 638788.000 174.360 165663 418040 1108.654 13000.000 
2007 Mean 237.131 53012.157 16.986 13869.301 44533.101 705.853 518.208 
 Std 672.927 131736.926 39.110 30901.526 98705.354 219.677 2388.781 
 Min 2.334 1713.684 0.414 235.968 1617.669 314.423 0.000 
  Max 3821.000 740728.000 180.667 169634 488888 1240.385 14500.000 
2008 Mean 260.338 78139.174 22.358 21322.389 67194.305 745.134 52.575 
 Std 767.939 205429.857 58.211 59394.906 175603.576 227.761 228.237 
 Min 1.265 1989.197 0.453 243.475 1708.452 324.450 0.000 
  Max 4406.000 1009277.000 281.000 329943 827988 1390.385 1345.000 
2009 Mean 294.335 78711.920 21.864 26945.321 61287.678 996.923 103.899 
 Std 776.758 200698.566 56.218 82448.481 153680.18 902.506 305.148 
 Min 1.265 2082.282 0.433 192.005 1673.207 346.662 0.000 
  Max 3833.000 938367.000 267.300 480020 744044 5600.000 1531.250 
2010 Mean 305.683 79964.461 22.471 26597.173 61962.104 1129.034 160.032 
 Std 870.004 202513.046 58.618 77110.919 156809.806 758.887 824.669 
 Min 1.051 2142.702 0.442 91.494 1670.698 334.183 0.000 
  Max 4965.000 930369.000 272.200 439923 721151 3239.847 5000.000 
2011 Mean 321.306 92017.030 23.019 31011.683 64781.445 1069.532 156.465 
 Std 909.725 234728.807 59.906 90323.817 163094.293 573.319 743.931 
 Min 0.837 2086.125 0.435 178.272 1517.724 334.183 0.000 
  Max 5105.000 1127806.000 264.200 507255 737142 3141.667 4500.000 
2012 Mean 355.023 99109.989 23.332 31603.69 68070.474 1053.962 127.059 
 Std 963.470 251729.886 60.461 88964.382 169046.634 464.920 444.510 
 Min 0.624 1779.537 0.034 132.909 292.562 371.000 0.000 
  Max 5147.000 1193593.000 269.200 490169 770090 2800.000 2600.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Diachronic representation of the number of banks with efficiency scores 
above samples’ average efficiency value. 
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Figure 2: The effect of time and CEO’s compensation on banks’ performance levels 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables per bank 
 
  
Property Plant and 
Equipment Deposits Number of Securities Loans Salary Bonus 
Bank Name USD (000’ s) USD (000’ s) 
 Employees (000’ 
s) USD (000’ s) USD (000’ s) USD (000’ s) USD (000’ s) 
  Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP 14.633 1.772 12217.450 1030.143 1.701 0.124 4945.381 2444.113 14346.086 1394.315 713.587 148.690 67.088 142.095 
BANK OF HAWAII CORP 16.848 4.822 8848.355 1424.773 2.512 0.136 4422.476 1957.832 5466.727 406.691 486.510 183.469 204.500 415.942 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 
CORP 700.500 248.083 
126507.30
0 68294.493 36.608 11.860 49080.800 27619.673 37813.500 5647.043 818.128 76.218 2311.347 2833.392 
BB&T CORP 306.660 64.547 94787.292 24981.168 29.470 3.243 26244.336 8336.623 85731.733 19207.246 726.264 197.292 150.669 249.831 
BBX CAPITAL CORP 14.961 0.000 3582.476 451.175 1.994 1.012 846.951 350.338 3578.606 1374.419 535.686 47.670 461.380 793.865 
CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 10.304 2.964 6183.922 1194.274 1.011 0.086 2303.554 758.892 5855.593 1486.230 973.100 233.012 247.500 402.528 
CITY NATIONAL CORP 28.797 7.220 15115.614 4400.923 2.880 0.377 4797.738 2695.059 11220.276 2327.291 960.508 38.237 351.232 565.972 
COMERICA INC 101.361 11.117 43608.300 3865.653 10.307 1.051 6720.800 2581.179 42533.100 4038.636 
1153.59
1 567.055 353.810 592.425 
COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC 15.956 1.790 3701.862 917.896 1.562 0.302 1643.247 493.000 2864.473 526.844 390.462 137.084 21.843 36.223 
CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 31.413 5.928 12179.421 3802.801 3.655 0.259 4697.616 2257.020 7050.826 1500.542 729.500 102.265 3968.116 2177.108 
DIME COMMUNITY 
BANCSHARES 2.079 1.611 2257.085 194.314 0.421 0.019 330.571 141.886 2982.415 480.173 668.360 31.903 289.600 134.430 
EAST WEST BANCORP INC 36.327 31.901 10314.091 5652.229 1.639 0.672 1987.836 1032.675 9571.999 4081.668 
1235.16
7 994.658 445.071 716.663 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 211.542 140.256 74737.300 11350.834 20.950 0.943 17742.800 5992.474 66701.200 10970.438 
1185.11
9 869.029 96.360 167.356 
FIRST BANCORP P R 22.163 4.395 10673.788 2086.209 2.621 0.345 4177.913 1379.604 10853.198 1910.458 673.528 161.739 261.240 295.010 
FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC 13.257 2.521 5794.833 675.951 1.751 0.098 1890.972 582.700 4835.472 523.592 531.229 296.100 83.317 94.835 
GLACIER BANCORP INC 10.453 3.404 3432.426 1269.596 1.409 0.374 1654.237 1077.487 3024.959 901.144 309.661 48.712 75.000 81.650 
HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC 6.677 2.803 17909.024 6268.871 1.407 0.242 17021.537 7537.830 22635.720 8488.961 
1279.88
5 353.118 363.529 637.208 
INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MI 6.288 1.906 2237.848 337.859 1.268 0.136 330.653 162.904 2059.814 443.217 372.462 123.957 24.568 45.469 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 4210.800 696.319 
798186.70
0 
285502.71
1 198.453 52.342 
294882.90
0 
170798.28
5 
520798.50
0 
179300.10
6 
1091.66
7 194.246 5690.000 5148.344 
M & T BANK CORP 187.699 10.211 45166.357 10550.391 13.994 0.769 7694.540 821.780 46239.191 9461.579 954.289 575.406 247.000 237.711 
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NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP 
INC 37.164 12.131 16418.203 5687.833 2.883 0.744 6263.829 1375.776 21821.579 6973.153 
1000.00
0 98.601 855.127 739.820 
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 104.270 6.507 53984.910 19473.290 11.143 2.343 16833.520 8547.157 23546.230 4957.106 715.500 236.665 135.000 284.849 
PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP 
INC 627.400 399.377 
127206.70
0 70289.702 39.871 16.051 39237.900 20047.073 99617.900 59490.300 
1234.42
3 569.420 
38003.47
7 
19732.31
8 
POPULAR INC 97.904 36.397 24928.184 3450.359 10.631 1.968 8567.755 2634.964 24902.303 3000.725 861.594 273.319 187.796 358.414 
PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 12.947 5.694 5773.209 3083.762 1.337 0.549 3279.954 2061.739 2767.856 1368.731 567.911 149.554 149.040 132.417 
STERLING BANCORP/NY 6.367 1.669 1890.086 606.929 0.535 0.083 858.096 219.778 1491.381 398.459 845.249 171.380 237.500 383.379 
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES 
INC 22.253 3.601 7949.963 2698.096 2.835 0.516 1819.003 602.271 7425.704 2685.460 691.424 134.751 57.965 123.635 
TCF FINANCIAL CORP 72.247 16.903 10368.001 1994.846 8.176 1.111 1877.010 446.147 12233.915 2391.950 800.192 289.341 573.500 623.824 
TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY 3.574 1.142 3086.476 508.225 0.645 0.114 1020.755 176.103 1915.059 536.054 561.500 275.056 317.225 310.896 
U S BANCORP 655.010 127.981 
164774.10
0 49172.426 55.632 5.778 49042.500 13074.551 
154097.00
0 36633.802 803.139 206.342 375.000 644.313 
UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 10.798 0.955 5417.991 940.846 1.479 0.100 1180.033 318.567 5294.160 817.096 648.050 54.377 140.900 183.648 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL INC 6.154 2.167 6641.302 1766.046 0.984 0.217 2072.868 818.626 7429.562 1725.951 479.088 151.960 7.348 12.426 
WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP 68.183 19.114 12269.978 1806.106 3.052 0.222 4333.308 1409.762 11405.047 1066.744 991.256 324.034 175.110 282.280 
WELLS FARGO & CO 2811.700 984.377 
586780.50
0 
310607.36
6 211.070 63.334 
122644.40
0 84146.436 
530519.50
0 
245521.34
7 
1828.92
2 
1722.26
2 827.500 1429.960 
WESTAMERICA 
BANCORPORATION 9.045 1.592 3744.587 416.711 0.950 0.058 1664.453 374.559 2487.083 288.530 372.500 5.874 135.000 217.371 
WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 17.460 4.861 8688.478 3233.712 2.138 0.707 1415.336 372.386 7496.434 2915.105 792.500 167.984 188.300 282.524 
ZIONS BANCORPORATION 178.928 95.120 36183.663 8426.848 10.061 1.137 4869.333 749.005 32722.011 7174.098 986.916 350.782 3882.417 1001.227 
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Table 3: Mean efficiency values and standard deviations (Std) for full and partial 
frontiers over 2003-2012. 
 
Bank Name Mean (VRS) Mean (Order-α) Std (VRS) Std (Order-α) 
ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP 0.396 0.951 0.043 0.003 
BANK OF HAWAII CORP 0.485 0.937 0.035 0.008 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 0.190 0.759 0.190 0.612 
BB&T CORP 0.497 0.290 0.364 0.205 
BBX CAPITAL CORP 0.547 0.856 0.006 0.197 
CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 0.495 0.978 0.020 0.005 
CITY NATIONAL CORP 0.452 0.889 0.054 0.033 
COMERICA INC 0.237 0.510 0.113 0.031 
COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC 0.535 0.961 0.007 0.006 
CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 0.495 0.882 0.040 0.023 
DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES 0.533 0.753 0.003 0.235 
EAST WEST BANCORP INC 0.501 0.920 0.021 0.065 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.091 0.197 0.177 0.113 
FIRST BANCORP P R 0.450 0.927 0.034 0.018 
FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC 0.520 0.960 0.011 0.009 
GLACIER BANCORP INC 0.528 0.952 0.016 0.058 
HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC 0.147 0.948 0.140 0.033 
INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MI 0.552 0.479 0.005 0.067 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 0.711 0.865 0.236 0.145 
M & T BANK CORP 0.224 0.327 0.137 0.080 
NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP INC 0.331 0.882 0.027 0.058 
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 0.262 0.428 0.196 0.161 
PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC 0.558 0.196 0.342 0.114 
POPULAR INC 0.372 0.610 0.081 0.070 
PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 0.507 0.916 0.034 0.095 
STERLING BANCORP/NY 0.539 0.615 0.004 0.167 
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 0.522 0.920 0.020 0.019 
TCF FINANCIAL CORP 0.589 0.756 0.031 0.023 
TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY 0.536 0.823 0.004 0.221 
U S BANCORP 0.699 0.208 0.175 0.030 
UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 0.524 0.965 0.005 0.007 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL INC 0.485 0.984 0.020 0.009 
WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP 0.478 0.860 0.016 0.027 
WELLS FARGO & CO 0.562 0.776 0.252 0.138 
WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 0.527 0.979 0.006 0.005 
WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 0.521 0.934 0.011 0.028 
ZIONS BANCORPORATION 0.539 0.465 0.208 0.159 
 
 
  
 
 
